In November 2015 the Center for Transatlantic Relations, a SAIS DC affiliated think-tank, organized a conference titled "Twenty Years after Dayton: Prospect for Progress in Reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina." The conference convened the highest echelons of society and the international community in Bosnian and Herzegovina (BiH) who together discussed the reforms and results achieved so far, as well as challenges, obstacles and opportunities for future democratization of Bosnian and Herzegovina.
All participants at the conference agreed on one aspect: twenty years after its signing, the Dayton Agreement succeeded in ending the violent conflict which destroyed the multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic violence and an armed struggle today are very unlikely, as society in BiH has moved toward more peaceful processes of problem solving. However, in many other aspects, the Dayton Agreement failed to create measurable outcomes as it established a highly decentralized and non-functional state with the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat federation.
More precisely, during the first ten years of peace, until 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed a relative success in the state and institution building efforts, and boosted a sense of relative confidence between previously conflicting parties. However, as Mr. Inzko, the High Representative and EU Special Representative for BiH, pointed out at the conference, in the last 10 years BiH has been experiencing a sort of stagnation due to the lack of reform agenda on the table. This stagnation contributed to the dismal social, economic, and political situation, and triggered social protests in February 2014 when ubiquitous discontent, due to the high unemployment, rampant corruption, endemic nepotism and the lack of growth and investment became obvious and sporadically violent. These protests concerned the international community which became afraid of further instability and the outcome such instability could bring to BiH and the wider Balkan region. The expressed social discontent created the sense of urgency which required that the structural problems of BiH be immediately addressed.
In order to challenge such an urgent and intractable situation in which BiH got caught after 10 years of stagnation, leaders from every constituent nation, after 13 failed drafts agreed in July 2015 on the Reform Agenda which addressed six crucial areas i.e. public finance and taxation; labor market; business competiveness; rule of law and good governance; social welfare and pension reform; and public administration reform. As Mr. Gary O'Callaghan, Special Advisor to the EU Representative in BiH observed, due to the lack of political will to address constitutional issues such as the Sejdic-Finci case, this Reform Agenda exclusively concentrates on the socio-political reforms and thus requires additional patience and time to be implemented and deliver measurable outcomes. Finally, in his concluding words, Mr. Inzko claimed that BiH has already experienced the lack of significant reforms and now urgently needs progress which would move the country toward stabilization. This is the crucial reason why the political elites, together with the international community in BiH, cannot allow this Reform Agenda to fail.
At the end of the conference Mr. Igor Crnadak, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of BiH and the representative of the Bosnian Serbs in the federal government, indicated that the Dayton Agreement deserved more focus, but that the BiH society has been at the crossroads in this regard. Namely, the Dayton Agreement could be either changed completely, which is unlikely in the current political environment, or be modified in order to address existing pervasive weaknesses in BiH. However, the most important feature for any reform of the Dayton agreement would be that any change must be agreed by all three constituent people, as any other reform would be catastrophic for BiH. In his further elaboration on the current situation in BiH, the foreign minister presented some positive steps, such as the positive EU progress report, stable currency, and low inflation which assure that BiH could move forward and overcome the current political and constitutional stalemate. In conclusion, discussing the possible referendum which RS plans to hold, despite the fear that it might actually stir up ethnic tensions, Mr. Crnadak mentioned that if held, the referendum will have a certain negative effect on reforms. Despite this, he expressed the hope that the parties will find a common solution and that the referendum will be withheld.
Notwithstanding the lack of efficiency of the BiH judicial system, the absence of willingness to deal with the high-level corruption and constitutional and political reforms, participants at the conference made a two-fold conclusion; first, Bosnia and Herzegovina urgently needs to embrace a comprehensive reform plan embodied in the 2015 Reform Agenda in order to address the previous ten years of social, economic and political stagnation. Finally, with the positive socio-economic changes that such an Agenda would bring, BiH could concentrate on political and constitutional reforms which are the main causes of destabilization of the Bosnian state.