Jeremy Bowen, BBC News' International Editor, has reported on over twenty wars and conflicts throughout his career. He has been a foreign correspondent since 1987, beginning with coverage of the El Salvador civil war in 1989, and later expanding to report on major Middle East events, including the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Syrian Civil War. Bowen was based in Jerusalem from 1995-2000 and has returned multiple times, covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1991. He has conducted interviews with world leaders such as Volodymyr Zelensky, Bashar al-Assad, and Muammar Gaddafi, as well as the new leader of Syria, Ahmad Al-Sharaa. Bowen's extensive body of work also encompasses reporting on Libya, Yemen, and the rise of ISIS, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In an interview with SAIS graduate student Antonella Navarro, Bowen reflects on the challenges of frontline journalism and discusses the evolving media landscape and its pressures.

Throughout your career, you've had to explain complex issues to the public, particularly in relation to ongoing conflicts. What would you say has been the most challenging story to explain?

The Arab Israeli conflict is permanently a challenge to explain. While there are some very clear, recurring factors, we must keep repeating them because, to a large extent, people don't fully grasp the complexity. It's also a topic that many people find daunting because it seems so complicated. And, on top of that, people have such strong, often polarized feelings about it, which makes it even more difficult. More than any other global issue, this conflict has the potential to provoke intense anger. As a result, explaining it in a fair, level-headed way, while still addressing where I think the key issues lie, is always a delicate challenge.

You've covered several conflicts since your first in El Salvador in 1986. In your view, how has the practice of war journalism evolved over time?

War itself hasn't changed, but war journalism has. One of the biggest changes is technological. When I was covering wars in the former Yugoslavia in the early '90s, to get our pictures out on television news, we had to rely on portable earth stations to transmit via satellite. The engineers would set these up on the roofs of hotels—never in the frontline areas, always way back from the action. These setups were very expensive and required a constant power supply, so we had to go back to those locations regularly. Now, as long as you have an internet connection, transmitting is far simpler. But another major change is that journalists have become much more of a target than we were in the past. People are more aware of the media now, and many see it as a key player in the conflict. Winning the media war has become critically important.

Given the rise of misinformation and a growing distrust in traditional media, how do you see the future of journalism?

It's the biggest challenge because credibility is everything. We must find ways to keep our trust and reestablish it with those who've lost it. The way we do that is to explain the news-gathering process more. How we gather information, assess it, and verify it. We now have this new brand, 'BBC Verify', which is a good idea. The downside is that people say, well, what about the bits that aren't branded BBC verified? Does that mean they're not verified? Of course, they are. The most effective way is is when the stories have an absolute explainer or if they're using the new science of open-source intelligence.

Middle East - Israel and Palestine:

You've often described Jerusalem as a complicated city during your time living there, and how it reflects the broader Israeli Palestinian conflict. Could you expand on that?

Jerusalem is an incredibly complicated city, and the conflict affects every aspect of life in ways that are impossible to escape. It's exhausting. From the town planning system to how highways are built and how municipal services are allocated, there's an apparent disparity between Jewish and Arab areas. For example, before 1948 and again in 1967, Jerusalem was divided between Jordan and Israel. Israeli planners had maps and projections when designing roads in their area. They planned to eventually control the whole city and extend those roads into the part under Jordanian control. The situation for Palestinian Arabs is especially difficult. It's extremely hard for them to get permission to build. There's a clear intention to limit their presence and lower the Palestinian population. The Israeli government uses the planning system, zoning laws, and even the issuance of ID cards to manage this. For example, suppose a Palestinian is born and raised in Jerusalem but goes away to study for a few years. In that case, they can lose their Jerusalem ID. The government claims that because their life is now centered elsewhere, they no longer have a right to live in Jerusalem. On the other hand, Jews from anywhere in the world can live wherever they choose in Israel and Jerusalem. This system reflects racial and religious discrimination in favor of Jews, which is deeply embedded in the Israeli political system. Israeli officials justify it by stating that Israel is a state for Jews. But even beyond the occupied territories, it's worth noting that 20% of Israel's population is non-Jewish, it is Arab.

Israel's political landscape has shifted significantly in recent years. In your view, what has caused the left wing to fade from the mainstream political scene in Israel?

The shift began during the Second Intifada, starting in 2000. There was a growing sense among many on the left that the Palestinians had betrayed them. Israelis felt they were led to believe that resistance, violence, or terrorism would no longer be a problem. Many started questioning how they could have peace with people who seemed unwilling to accept them. However, the transformation went beyond the impact of the Second Intifada. I remember attending briefings with pollsters in the mid-90s. One senior pollster, very experienced at the time, pointed out a significant demographic shift in Israel. The growing population of Mizrahi Jews—those who's families had immigrated from Middle Eastern countries —tended to lean more right-wing. On the other hand, the traditional elite, mostly Ashkenazi Jews whose families had come from Eastern and Western Europe, were more left leaning. Historically, Labor Zionism, which was more left-wing, focused on security but also believed that Israel would eventually need to find a way to coexist with its neighbors. On the right, however, the prevailing sentiment was different. The belief was that strength, and resolve would eventually force others to recognize Israeli dominance, and that Israel should not compromise for peace but rather ensure security and assert control.

From your reporting, aside from the high population density, what makes the Israel-Hamas conflict particularly deadly for journalists?

I think one of the reasons so many journalists have died in this conflict is that, in some cases, they've been specifically targeted. I can't prove it, but there are enough instances where it seems more than just coincidence. Another factor is that journalists often put themselves in hazardous situations, particularly in areas where large bombs have gone off. Local Palestinians may be involved in rescue efforts, pulling people from the rubble, and journalists are often with them. But when the Israelis conduct follow-up strikes, they frequently target moving vehicles, which puts journalists at risk. The issue of Israeli targeting of civilians is a significant factor. The level of force used against Palestinian civilians is disproportionate to the actual threat they pose to the Israeli military. Israel, however, believes in using disproportionate force as a form of deterrence. Essentially, they believe in responding to even small attacks with overwhelming force. It's the "you scratch my face; I chop off your head" approach.

Russia & Ukraine:

You've also reported extensively on the Russia-Ukraine war. How has the conflict in Ukraine changed since its outset, and what do you see as the key driving forces behind Ukraine's ongoing resistance to Russian invasion?

The bottom line is that Ukrainians want to remain independent. They don't want to be part of Russia, and they certainly don't want to fall under Moscow's control again, something they've experienced for a very long time. Ukraine has a painful history with Russia. There was the man-made famine in the 1930s, which killed millions, and years of oppression under the Soviet Union. Ukrainians want to be free from that kind of control. As for Putin, he's made it clear that it's not just about the territory—it's not just about holding onto the land they've already taken. He wants more. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was Jimmy Carter's national security advisor and originally Polish, once said, "Russia without Ukraine can never be an empire. Russia with Ukraine is automatically an empire." It's a great line.

There's been a lot of debate over NATO's role in provoking Russia's aggression. How do you interpret this argument, and do you believe that NATO's expansion up to Russia's borders contributed to the current conflict in Ukraine?

I think NATO's expansion, especially near Russia's borders, helped as it played into the hands of extremists. It definitely provoked Russia. If you're familiar with George Kennan's work on containment, he warned about this. Kennan, who lived to be over 100, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times in 1998 where he predicted that NATO's eastward expansion would inflame Russian nationalism and militarism, and it's hard not to see that now. Some people in Britain dismissed this view after the invasion, thinking it echoed Russian propaganda, but I believe it's true. I think Poland was probably fine, but after 2000, things changed. The turning point came at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest when NATO promised membership to Georgia and Ukraine, but without giving a clear timeline. A few years later, Russia took control of parts of Georgia, and by 2014, it took a larger part of Ukraine. NATO might have been accepted up to Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, but pushing right up to Russia's borders was probably a step too far.

Given the scale of the conflict and the amount of foreign support Ukraine is receiving, what is your assessment of Ukraine's ability to continue defending itself against Russia?

Ukraine could hold out for a while. If Europe continues to provide support, they have a chance. Ukraine would suffer if all American aid were to stop, but if European countries pulled out all the stops to help, they could still manage. During the Soviet era, Ukraine was one of the major centers of the Soviet military-industrial complex. They produced vast amounts of weapons, and they still have a strong industrial base. For example, they produce their own aircraft through Antonov, a Ukrainian company. They also manufacture millions of drones and other weapons. They're not a powerless country.

Looking back at Europe's response to Russia's buildup in Ukraine, where do you think Europe went wrong?

Europe didn't think Putin would go through with it. In the weeks before the invasion, as troops had been gathering on the border for some time, it was hard to understand what interest he could have in starting this conflict. There was a lot of doubt and misinformation spreading around. Even Zelensky didn't believe it would happen. If you read Bob Woodward's book, which gets inside details on these things, it's clear the Americans had solid intelligence—either human sources or deep signals intelligence—and they told Zelensky what was coming. But he didn't believe them either because he couldn't understand why Russia would do this. In 2018, Ukraine even ran a war game simulation, and it showed that, based on the situation at the time, if Russia invaded, they'd be at the Polish border within two weeks. I heard this from someone in Ukrainian intelligence in Kyiv. They didn't believe the Russians would have no Western response, thinking it would be a dumb move. But they underestimated Putin's determination. Even though the U.S. knew what was happening, they failed to stop it. A firm message from Biden might have deterred Putin. Maybe if American or NATO troops had been moved into Ukraine, it would have made a difference.

Political Figures & Middle East Politics:

Having interviewed both Bashar al-Assad and Ahmed Al-Sharaa, what have you observed about their leadership styles and political strategies?

Simon Collis, the former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said to me that the way to understand the Assad family is to look at mafia movies like The Godfather or Goodfellas because that's how it works. Only instead of running a racket in New Jersey like Tony Soprano, the whole country is that racket, and they extract all they can from it. As you disrespect them or go against them, they'll crush you. That's how a sort of mafia model of government works. Al-Sharaa is different because, well, he started as a Jihadi fighter. He was in Iraq. He fought against the Americans in Iraq, and then he was sent to Syria by Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2012 to set up a Syrian franchise. Then, he broke with them and went his own way. He's been in this process of evolution, but he's still very much coming at it from an Islamist background. However, Assad made a whole big thing about being secular.