The Electoral Act 2026: What Has Changed, and What Does It Mean for Nigeria's 2027 Elections?
Elekwa Ezekiel Chisom
November 18, 2026
On 18th February 2026, President Bola Tinubu signed the Electoral Act 2026 into law prior to the upcoming general elections, scheduled for Janurary 16th 2027. The reforms were instituted in the wake of a struggle for transparency in the previous elections which took place in 2023 and a dispute between lawmakers about the electronic transmission of the results. These discussions brought the importance of defining the process for sharing results to the fore, as well as how to deal with technical failures. However, alongside measures to increase transparency, the Electoral Act 2026 allows for significantly increased spending on election campaigns and donations. The outcome is increased opportunities for the public to watch elections, and increased opportunities for rich candidates and their funders to influence the election.
Electronic Results Transmission: Transparency and Technical Failures
The reforms included in this article relate to result transmission in an electronic form, voters' accreditation, party membership registers, selection of candidates, preparation of campaigns, and campaign funding. These provisions need to be explained first, and then the implications for transparency, political participation and accountability explored.The biggest change to be monitored is what happens once the votes are counted. The provision of Section 60(3), which stipulates that presiding officers must make the results of polling units available electronically on a prescribed Form EC8A to the INEC Result Viewing Portal, IReV, upon completion of the form, is explicit. It is important to note that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the agency that conducts Nigeria's federal and state elections while the The INEC's Result Viewing Portal (IReV) is a platform for public viewing of INEC's uploaded polling-unit result sheets. The presiding officer's official record of the votes cast at a polling unit is Form EC8A. Section 60(3) calls for electronic transmission, but allows for reliance on the signed physical form in the event of a failure of communication. However, the signed physical form is the main source of collation and declaration where there is a failure in communication to make transmission possible. This is because the gap between polling station announcement of the results and final counting is important. Electronic access will enable those who participated in the elections, journalists, observers and party agents to verify the originalities of the figures with those that are entering into the collation process. It establishes a benchmark, and makes unexplained discrepancies difficult to ignore. For example, observers might spot a discrepancy if a candidate's tally on the polling-unit form does not match the tally in the collation form, or if a polling unit's results are absent.
Having the signed paper form will help protect against loss of communication networks after voting is complete. But INEC ought to record the failed transmissions, give reason for failure and upload results when connectivity is restored. The INEC also needs to inform affected polling units and state publicly about the delays. This would enable citizens to tell the difference between a technical error and deliberate non-compliance with the electoral laws and enable INEC to defend the results it will produce in the case of a dispute.
Voter Accreditation: Reliability and Access
The Act also explicitly provides for BVAS or other technological device prescribed by INEC as a means to voter accreditation. The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) is a device that verifies voters through fingerprints or facial recognition. Its effectiveness depends on reliable equipment, trained officials and clear procedures for addressing verification failures. Preparations must therefore prevent impersonation while ensuring that technical problems do not unfairly exclude eligible voters.This will help build the backbone of voter verification, while the usefulness will depend on the availability of good equipment and the application of it. A device which cannot be impersonated plays an important role; a device which cannot be impersonated and which has no effective response, leaves eligible citizens unable to vote. Both risks need to be addressed during preparations for 2027 elections. When technical safeguards help to ensure that access to information is protected, they will gain the public's trust and confidence in the system.
Party Primaries: Participation and Internal Democracy
The law also alters the way political parties select options for voters at the polling unit. Some indirect primaries have been eliminated, and there are direct primaries and consensus.The Act keeps direct primaries and consensus while eliminating indirect primaries as a means of choosing party candidates. Instead of delegates making the decision, eligible party members can vote for candidates in direct primaries. Parties are required to provide INEC with a membership register (in digital form) at least 21 days prior to the primary, congress or convention. Increasing the number of candidates that can be opened to ordinary members may dilute the impact of a small delegate electorate. But the integrity of party registers is a key consideration with the reform. The individual who controls access to the register can determine who takes part in the primary and, ultimately, who becomes a candidate. An "open" contest may be under tight control if members are omitted or if they are not provided with a "fair chance" to correct omissions.
The promise of direct primaries in a democratic system thus starts before the voters' ballot, in the very process of choosing candidates. Members must be aware if they are registered or how any disputes will be handled and if the register they are using is the one submitted to INEC. Consensus should be treated similarly: to obtain consensus without coercion is a different form of democracy than to obtain it through coercion. These requirements have already become a source of political contention. When the Zenith Labor Party contested the membership-register and nomination clauses, these requirements became the focus of legal action. In INEC v. Zenith Labor Party, the Supreme Court upheld Sections 77(5)–(7) and 84(2), which the Court of Appeal had declared unconstitutional, on September 24, 2026. The ruling emphasizes how crucial compliance is; INEC must implement the rules uniformly to ensure that similar infractions are handled similarly by all parties. The effects of the specific nominations will be different depending on the facts and the steps that are taken in court. Enforcement should be uniform. If similar violations were met with different consequences based on the party, a provision to ensure internal democracy would lose its legitimacy and effectiveness quickly. The debate surrounding these amendments is exemplified by the Zenith Labor Party's challenge to the membership-register and nomination requirements. Sections 77(5)–(7) and 84(2), which the Court of Appeal had declared unconstitutional, were reinstated by the Supreme Court on September 24, 2026. In order to avoid selective enforcement undermining their goals, INEC must implement these standards uniformly across political parties after their legitimacy has been established.
Campaign Finance: Higher Limits and Unequal Competition
The other way of change isn't so promising with campaign finance. The presidential spending ceiling is increased from N5b to N10b and the governorship spending ceiling is increased from N1b to N3b. The highest amount allowed to a candidate goes up by 10 times, from ₦50 million to ₦500 million. Raised caps can accept the cost of campaigning, but also allow more money to be channeled to candidates. These are maximum numbers and not requirements, but they have an impact on those who can't raise as much money. The right to vote does not necessarily mean having an effective opportunity to vote. Voters' access to a competitive range of political options may be limited as a result of candidates with less money finding it difficult to compete with wealthier rivals.
Following elections, people, journalists, and civil society organizations should closely examine whether elected officials give special treatment to significant campaign funders. Those who rely on a handful of big donors could be coming into office with a debt that voters are not immediately aware of. Effective oversight will therefore need to ensure the sources of campaign funding, how it is used and if expenditure is being properly attributed. The higher the ceiling, the more impactful that scrutiny. It doesn't lessen the need to enforce the rules or separate good campaigning from vote-buying.
Election Administration: Funding and Preparation
The administrative changes are also worthy of the same attention. The notice period before elections has been reduced from 360 days to 300 days and the time limit for funds to be released during the election period has been shortened from one year prior to the general election to six months. The INEC Fund was already established in the 2022 Act. The INEC Fund's existence by itself does not prove increased financial independence because it was already established by the 2022 Act. Whether INEC gets enough money early enough to buy equipment, educate staff, and test election systems is what counts. Funding and preparation are still available but an operational readiness needs to be proven by the timely procurement of staff, training, tested systems.
Conclusion: Credibility Depends on Implementation
Combined, the reforms do not constitute automatic assurances of credible elections, nor are they a reason to abandon the pursuit of reform. They establish more explicit responsibilities at key points of the process and leave hard issues of discretion, enforcement and unequal resources. The most significant evidence will be pragmatic – whether party members can prove eligibility, whether accreditation is effective, whether the collated results from the polling units can be traced and whether any failings in accreditation are followed up, irrespective of party affiliation. These are the areas where the new law will engage with the nature of electoral competition. The upcoming election in Nigeria will be evaluated based on the trust that Nigerians have in the electoral process, particularly when there is a challenge. When voters, party agents, or candidates raise concerns about missing result uploads, disparities in vote totals, or accreditation issues, INEC's response will be crucial in determining public trust. The Electoral Act is taking us further on the road of transparency. Whether it will have any enduring impact will rely on whether or not voters can get credible answers when they use that right.